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Searching for the Fourth Amendment: In a Post-September 11 th
World, Does the Rationale of the Fourth Circuit in United States
v. Jenkins I Reduce the Fourth Amendment Protections of Individ-
uals on Military Installations?*
INTRODUCTION
Envision driving on a military base with your family tucked away
in the minivan. Your children are joyfully singing along to the patriotic
songs on the radio, and you can feel the anticipation as you take your
family to its first Fourth of July fireworks display. As you navigate the
unfamiliar streets of the base, you notice the unwelcoming blue and
white lights flashing in your rearview mirror. A military police officer
with a hardened scowl approaches your car, ducks her head into your
window, and without asking you any questions, briskly orders you and
your family to step outside the van. The police officer then proceeds to
search the interior of your vehicle and personal belongings. In the
past, the Fourth Amendment requirements would make a scene such
as this incomprehensible. However, in the post-September 11th world,
the changing nature of the military's response to terrorist threats and
the closing of all military installations to the public could drastically
impact an individual's constitutionally protected privacy while on a
military installation.
This comment will begin by discussing how the Fourth Circuit's
rationale in United States v. Jenkins could be interpreted as an excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause require-
ments on closed military installations.2 Next, this comment will
establish the legal definition of a closed military base to determine the
potential impact of any interpretation of the Fourth Circuit's decision
in Jenkins. Then, this comment will analyze how Jenkins could be
interpreted in both broad and narrow ways and why the narrower read-
ing of the Jenkins opinion should be followed. This comment will then
consider how other circuits have evaluated searches conducted on
closed military installations. Finally, this comment will analyze the
potential future impacts that, if read in its broadest sense, the rationale
1. 986 F.2d 76 (4th Cir. 1993).
* The author would like to thank Professor William A. Woodruff for his guidance
in preparing this Comment for publication.
2. See Jenkins, 986 F.2d 76.
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in United States v. Jenkins will have on the Fourth Amendment and
individual rights in general.
United States v. Jenkins
Katrina Jenkins enlisted in the United States Air Force and was
stationed at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.3 While Ms. Jenkins
was stationed at Andrews Air Force Base, it was closed to the public.4
Thus, in order to enter Andrews, one had to stop at the security check-
point, and the guards would grant access to individuals authorized to
be on base.' On June 18, 1992, Ms. Jenkins' estranged husband, Nor-
man Jenkins, telephoned her at work, indicated he was on the base and
intended to kill her.6 At the time Mr. Jenkins placed the call, he was
sitting in the parking lot of the base hospital where Ms. Jenkins
worked.7 When Ms. Jenkins left work for the evening, a security
officer escorted her out of the hospital and to her car at her request."
Mr. Jenkins noticed the security officer escorting his wife and left the
hospital parking lot in an attempt to exit Andrews.9 Knowing of the
threats made against Ms. Jenkins by her husband, the security officer
phoned ahead to the security gate checkpoint, informed the guards on
duty that Mr. Jenkins was about to exit the base, and apprised them of
the threats Mr. Jenkins made against Ms. Jenkins.' Officials at the
base's access control gate arrested Mr. Jenkins based upon the infor-
mation given to them by the security guard." Upon his arrest, offi-
cials searched Mr. Jenkins' person and his vehicle and found a .357
Magnum, twenty-five cartridges, and letters indicating Mr. Jenkins
intended to kill his wife and then commit suicide.' 2
Mr. Jenkins was indicted for attempted murder on federal prop-
erty. 13 Prior to trial, Mr. Jenkins attempted to suppress the evidence
found in his vehicle based on the theory that the federal officials did
not have probable cause to suspect him of attempted murder at the
time of his arrest.14 Despite the evidence of Mr. Jenkins' threatening
3. Id. at 77.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 78.
14. Id.
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phone call to his wife, the district court found for Mr. Jenkins and
suppressed the evidence discovered in the search of his person and
vehicle.' 5 The federal government moved for reconsideration of the
district court's finding, arguing, "probable cause was not necessary for
a search on a closed military base.' 6 In the alternative, the govern-
ment argued the police had probable cause to conduct the search
based upon the threats Mr. Jenkins made to his wife. 1 7 On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's suppression of the evidence. 18 Instead of basing its deci-
sion upon established exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's probable
cause requirement (i.e. Terry'9 search of a vehicle or search incident to
arrest), the Fourth Circuit held that the nature of a closed military
installation changes the general analysis for what constitutes a reason-
able search.2 ° Most notably, the court stated, "The case law makes
clear that searches on closed military bases have long been exempt from
the usual Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause."'"
A complete look at the language of the Jenkins opinion results in
three possible conclusions: (1) an individual has no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy on a closed military installation, and thus any gov-
ernment search on such an installation is not a search protected by the
Fourth Amendment; (2) an individual impliedly consents to be
searched at any time while on a closed military installation; or (3) an
individual consents to be searched while on a closed military installa-
tion; however, the consent to be searched exists only near the exterior
of the base at the entry and exit points.22
What is a Closed Military Base?
In order to analyze the implications of the Fourth Circuit's ratio-
nale in Jenkins and other similar cases, one must first define the differ-
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
20. Jenkins, 986 F.2d at 78.
21. Id. (emphasis added); see United States v. Ellis, 547 F.2d 863, 866-67 (5th Cir.
1977); United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 493-94 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Vaughan, 475 F.2d 1262, 1264 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Grisby, 335 F.2d
652, 654-55 (4th Cir. 1964); United States v. Matthews, 431 F. Supp. 70, 72-73 (W.D.
Okla. 1976); United States v. Fox, 407 F. Supp. 857, 859-60 (W.D. Okla. 1975); United
States v. Burrow, 396 F. Supp. 890, 898-901 (D. Md. 1975); United States v. Crowley,
9 F.2d 927 (N.D. Ga. 1922).
22. See Jenkins, 986 F.2d 76.
20061.
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ence between closed and open military installations. The district
court in United States v. Ellis established the current definition for a
closed military installation.2 3 Specifically, the court in Ellis stated,
"[t]he case law has evolved to differentiate between a closed and an
open military base. At a closed base, all individuals and vehicles are
stopped at a gate and either granted or denied permission to enter. "24
At an open base, individuals may freely enter or exit the installation
without restriction.25
In 1992, when the Fourth Circuit decided Jenkins, there were very
few installations that fell within the judicial definition for a closed mil-
itary base.26 However, after the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, the United States Department of Defense drastically altered its
policies regarding military installation security.2 7 Today, entrance to
any military base requires passing through a security checkpoint and,
at a minimum, a showing of identification.28 Under an analysis that
defines closed military installations as those where security personnel
grant or deny access to individuals who desire to enter, every United
States military base is considered a closed military installation. There-
fore, if the rationale in Jenkins is read in its broadest sense, there is the
potential for many citizens who live and work on military bases
around the country to have their privacy interests greatly infringed
upon. The logical question thus becomes, does the holding in Jenkins,
juxtaposed with the post-September 1 1th security measures on mili-
tary installations, give military police the authority to conduct war-
rantless searches without probable cause simply because an individual
is present on a military base?
23. 15 F. Supp. 2d. 1025 (D. Colo. 1998).
24. Id. at 1029.
25. See id.
26. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't Army, Reg. 190-13, para. 1-23, para. 2-5d, The Army
Physical Security Program (Sept. 30, 1993); U.S. Dep't Army, Reg. 190-5, para. 3-1,
Motor Vehicle Traffic Supervision (August 7, 1988); U.S. Dep't Army, Reg. 525-13,
para. 4-6b (2), Antiterrorism (Jan. 4, 2002). See also U.S. Dep't Army, Reg. 190-51,
Security of Unclassified Army Property (Sensitive and Nonsensitive) (September 30,
.1993). Based my personal experience as a military intelligence officer in the U.S.
Army, the Army's security posture is based upon the compilation of the previously
listed regulations combined with the nation's current threat condition; each military
service branch has similar regulations that, when combined with the nations threat
level, dictate that military installations be closed to the general public. Prior to
September 1 1th, the nation's threat level did not require most military installations to
be closed.
27. See sources cited supra note 26. After September 11th, the nation's increased
threat level, dictated that military installations be closed to the general public. Id.
28. See sources cited supra note 26.
[Vol. 29:111
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INTERPRETING JENKINS BROADLY
A proper examination of the language in Jenkins necessarily
begins with an analysis of the Fourth Amendment. The drafters of the
United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights included the Fourth
Amendment as a protection from arbitrary and capricious intrusions
into the personal privacy of individuals by the state.29 The Fourth
Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.3 °
The Fourth Amendment is a balance between two weighty issues:
an individual's interest in being free from unnecessary intrusions by
law enforcement, and the state's interest in preventing crime and pro-
tecting its citizens.31 In its most simplistic sense, the Fourth Amend-
ment requires that law enforcement officials conduct only reasonable
searches, which are searches executed pursuant to a warrant and
based upon probable cause.32 The main objective of the Fourth
Amendment is sometimes misconstrued as the prevention of law
enforcement officials from utilizing their intuition to prevent crime
and protect citizens;3 3 however, "[the Fourth Amendment's] protection
consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."'34 When an
impartial magistrate affirms that probable cause to search exists, she
issues a warrant that specifically identifies the places to be searched
and the items to be seized.35
Not all searches initiated by the state require a warrant issued
upon probable cause. "[The] Fourth Amendment does not proscribe
all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those that
29. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
31. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
32. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486-87 (1964); Chapman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 610, 613-15 (1961); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261 (1960);
Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497-99 (1958).
33. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14.
34. Id.
35. United States v. Martinez, 78 F.3d 399, 401 (8th Cir. 1996).
2006] 115
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are unreasonable. '36 If an individual was subjected to an unreasonable
search or seizure, she may move to suppress all evidence obtained dur-
ing the unlawful search at any subsequent criminal trial.37
Expectation of Privacy and the Jenkins Decision
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Katz v. United States,3"
state searches were only subject to judicial scrutiny if the search
resulted in some form of physical intrusion.39 However, advances in
technology and the Court's expansion of the concept of privacy
resulted in a change to the Fourth Amendment analysis. Now, courts
look well beyond whether the state intruded an individual's physical
space.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation suspected Charles Katz of
using a particular phone booth in Los Angeles, California, to place ille-
gal bets.40 The federal agents attached a listening device to the phone
booth used by Mr. Katz to collect evidence of his activities and conver-
sations.4 1 Based largely upon evidence collected from the recording
device in the phone booth, Mr. Katz was convicted of violating a stat-
ute that proscribed placing bets and wagers across wire communica-
tions.4 ' The United States Supreme Court overturned Mr. Katz's
conviction concluding the federal agents' actions constituted an unlaw-
ful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 43 The Court recog-
nized the Fourth Amendment protection as an individual protection of
privacy, which the court reasoned Mr. Katz had in the phone booth.44
The Court specifically stated:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to pre-
serve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be consti-
tutionally protected.45
36. Morgan v. United States, 323 F.3d 776, 780-81 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Florida
v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)).
37. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
38. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
39. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
40. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 351.
45. Id. (citations omitted).
116 [Vol. 29:1 11
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The Court's shift away from the physical intrusion of the search to the
expectation of privacy test changed the Fourth Amendment analysis.46
Now, when determining whether a search conducted by government
officials violates the Fourth Amendment, one must ask whether the
individual "[first] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of pri-
vacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable."' 4 7 In other words, if the government
activity does not offend an individual's privacy that is subjectively held
and objectively reasonable, that activity does not constitute a search
and does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.4"
The Katz expectation of privacy analysis provides the foundation
for the first and broadest potential interpretation of the Jenkins opin-
ion. The Fourth Circuit in Jenkins stated:
[Mr.] Jenkins had no right of unrestricted access to Andrews Air
Force Base; he thus had no right to be free from searches while on the
base .... The barbed-wire fence, the security guards at the gate, the
sign warning of the possibility of search, and a civilian's common
sense awareness of the nature of a military base-all these circum-
stances combine to puncture any reasonable expectations of privacy
for a civilian who enters a closed military base.4
9
Based on the plain meaning of the language used by the Fourth Cir-
cuit, it appears that any individual who sets foot on a closed military
installation has no reasonable expectation of privacy. Therefore, any
search of Mr. Jenkins or his automobile would not be subject to judi-
cial scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment. ° If the Fourth Circuit's
opinion in Jenkins stands for the broad proposition that government
searches on a closed military installation are not searches under the
Fourth Amendment, then law enforcement officials on closed military
installations are not required to obtain a warrant or have probable
cause prior to searching individuals. Under this analysis, the govern-
ment's ability to conduct a warrantless search without probable cause
would not be limited to searches at the gates of closed military installa-
tions. Particularly, government officials could search an individual at
any place and at any time without a warrant. Due to the fact that all
military installations are now closed, this broad interpretation would
46. Id.; see also Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438 (holding that Fourth Amendment analysis
centers on physical intrusions).
47. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
48. Id.
49. Jenkins, 986 F.2d at 79.
50. See Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
2006]
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essentially result in an individual possessing no Fourth Amendment
protections while present on a closed military base.
Implied Consent and the Jenkins Decision
One of the well-delineated and specifically established exceptions
to the probable cause and the warrant requirements of the Fourth
Amendment is a search conducted pursuant to express or implied con-
sent.51 The implied consent exception provides the basis of the next
interpretation of the Jenkins decision. Unlike the reasonable expecta-
tion analysis in determining whether a search was constitutional, the
consent doctrine presumes the government performed a search gov-
erned by the Fourth Amendment, and an individual, though possess-
ing the right to compel the government to produce a warrant, consents
to a government search without requiring a warrant.52 In order for
consent to be valid under the Fourth Amendment framework, it must
be voluntarily given and cannot be the product of coercion.53 In
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the United States Supreme Court held,
"[Tihe question whether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or
was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question
of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. 54
Consequently, whether an individual has given valid consent to search
is a purely factual determination based on all of the circumstances
surrounding a case.55
In Jenkins, there existed no factual evidence that Mr. Jenkins gave
his express consent to search his person or vehicle. 56 However, at the
entrance to Andrews Air Force Base, there was a sign posted that
stated, "While on this Installation, all personnel and the property
under their control are subject to search. ''57 Thus, the question
becomes, whether Mr. Jenkins, by entering onto the military installa-
tion, impliedly consented to a search at any time during his presence
on the base.
In McGann v. N.E. Ill. Reg'l Commuter R.R. Corp., the Seventh Cir-
cuit answered a similar question.58 The defendant in McGann posted a
51. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (citing Davis v. United
States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946)).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 227.
54. Id.; see also United States v. Smith, 395 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2005).
55. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.
56. Jenkins, 986 F.2d 76.
57. Id. at 77.
58. 8 F.3d 1174 (7th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Burrow, 396 F. Supp. 890
(D. Md. 1975).
[Vol. 29:111
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sign at each of its parking lot gates stating: "Vehicles Entering or Exit-
ing Metra Property are Subject to Search by Metra Police." 9 The plain-
tiffs admitted that they had all read the signs and were aware of them;
however, the court in McGann noted, "consent is a waiver of the right
to demand that government agents obtain the authorization of a war-
rant to justify their search; and the need for a warrant is waived only to
the extent granted by the defendant in his consent. '60 The Seventh
Circuit held that the plaintiffs' reading and awareness of the posted
sign did not equal a grant of implied consent to search. 6 Specifically,
"[a] sign's blanket statement that a person is 'subject to search,' how-
ever, does not readily inform the person of the grounds for the search,
the extent of the search or the frequency or regularity of the
searches."62 Thus, in order to establish implied consent, the state in
McGann would have to establish specific actions by the plaintiffs
showing consent to the particular search in question.63
In Jenkins, the sign at Andrews Air Force Base alone was insuffi-
cient to authorize a warrantless search based on implied consent
under McGann; however, the government in Jenkins argued on appeal
that other circumstances taken in conjunction with the sign may have
been sufficient to constitute implied consent.64 Specifically, "[t]he gra-
vamen of the government's appeal is that the district court erred by
not recognizing an 'implied consent' exception to the requirement of
probable cause for closed military bases. By entering onto the closed
base, the government argues, Jenkins gave his consent to be searched
at any time."65
The Fourth Circuit, based upon the plain language of the Jenkins
opinion, agreed with the government's contention. First, the court
cited the totality of the circumstances test established by Schneckloth
for determining whether consent was given. 66 The court also cited sev-
eral previous cases using implied consent as the rationale for authoriz-
ing searches conducted without probable cause on closed military
installations. 67 Then, the court identified the special security con-
59. McGann, 8 F.3d at 1176.
60. Id. at 1180.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1181.
64. See United States v. Jenkins, 986 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1993).
65. Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
66. Id. (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)).
67. Jenkins, 986 F.2d at 79 (citing United States v. Ellis, 547 F.2d 863, 866-67 (5th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 493-94 (8th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Vaughan, 475 F.2d 1262, 1264 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Grisby, 335
2006] 119
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cerns existing on Andrews Air Force Base due to the President's fre-
quent travel in and out of that particular installation.6" The court also
noted that aside from the sign, informing individuals they were con-
senting to search upon entry, there were visible indications of a closed
installation that any casual observer would recognize (signs, gates,
security guards, and restricted access). 69 Thus, by choosing to enter,
in the face of all these circumstances, Mr. Jenkins impliedly consented
to a search at any time during his stay on Andrews Air Force Base.7°
An interpretation of Jenkins based upon implied consent seems
more realistic than the expectation theory described above, due to the
authority cited by the Fourth Circuit in Jenkins;71 however, the end
result, using either of these two theories, would be the same. In other
words, if a court determines that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy on a closed military installation or if a court
instead determines that an individual impliedly consents to be
searched at any time while present on a closed installation, the same
conclusion follows: law enforcement officials on closed installations
would have the authority to conduct a search at any time without prob-
able cause or a warrant. Since all military installations are now closed,
in a post-September 11th society, a broad interpretation of Jenkins
would essentially remove an individual's Fourth Amendment rights
while present on any military installation.
INTERPRETING JENKINS NARROWLY
Both the expectation analysis and the implied consent analysis
discussed above are plausible and defensible interpretations of Jenkins,
based upon the strict language of the court's opinion. Despite the fact
the language in Jenkins allows for a broad reading, the Fourth Circuit's
decision should be read narrowly to mean that an individual consents
to a search on a closed military installation only when she expressly
consents, when questioned by a government actor, or when she
impliedly consents at the exterior of a closed base by attempting to
enter or exit the installation because: 1) reading Jenkins to create a
closed military installation exception to the Fourth Amendment is
F.2d 652, 654-55 (4th Cir. 1964); United States v. Mathews, 431 F. Supp. 70, 72-73
(W.D. Okla, 1976); United States v. Fox, 407 F. Supp. 857, 859-60 (W.D. Okla. 1975);
United States v. Burrow, 396 F. Supp. 890, 898-901 (D. Md. 1975); United States v.
Crowley, 9 F.2d 927 (N.D. Ga. 1922)).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id.
120 [Vol. 29:111
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unnecessarily broad, based upon other exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment that apply to the facts in Jenkins; 2) a broad reading of
Jenkins would be inconsistent with the current policies regarding
searches on military installations; and 3) a limited reading of Jenkins is
consistent with the Supreme Court's recent decisions in analogous
border checkpoint scenarios.
Other Applicable Fourth Amendment Exceptions
"A [search or] seizure conducted without a warrant is 'per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few
specifically established and well delineated exceptions.'"72 As previ-
ously stated, Jenkins, if read broadly, could unnecessarily expand the
scope of searches on all military installations by creating a new excep-
tion to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment for searches con-
ducted on closed military bases. There are three existing Fourth
Amendment exceptions that would allow a warrantless search under
the facts in Jenkins without resulting in an unnecessary expansion of
the state's power to search on a closed military installation: a Terry73
search of a vehicle, the automobile exception, and warrantless searches
incident to arrest. Due to the existence of these other established
exceptions, the Fourth Circuit, in Jenkins, used unnecessarily broad
language to justify the search of Mr. Jenkins. Future courts should
limit their analysis of searches to firmly rooted exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment.
Terry Search of a Vehicle Exception to the Warrant and Probable Cause
Requirement of the Fourth Amendment
In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court allowed a warrantless search
of an individual without probable cause when a law enforcement offi-
cial had a reasonable suspicion that the individual being searched was
armed and dangerous."4 In Michigan v. Long, the Court extended a
Terry75 search of an individual's person to automobiles. 76 In Long,
police officers observed the defendant speeding, driving erratically,
and eventually driving off of the road into a ditch.77 The police
officers approached the defendant, who was standing at the rear of his
72. United States v. Hawkins, 249 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993)).
73. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
77. Id. at 1035.
20061
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car, and began to question him. 78 The defendant began to move back
towards the vehicle, and the police noticed a hunting knife on the
floorboard of the driver's side of the car. 79 The police then conducted
a Terry8" search of the defendant's person and looked into the passen-
ger compartment of the vehicle searching for other weapons.8 ' While
looking in the vehicle to search for weapons, the police discovered
marijuana.82 The Supreme Court determined that the interest of pro-
tecting police officers, which was the justification for the original Terry
search, is sufficient to allow searches of vehicles when the police have
reasonable suspicion that an individual near a vehicle is armed and
dangerous.8 3 The Court specifically stated:
[T]he search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited
to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissi-
ble if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on "specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant" the officer in believing that the
suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of
weapons.
84
In Jenkins, the security officers could have formed a reasonable
suspicion that Mr. Jenkins was armed and dangerous based upon the
threat he made to his wife.8 5 Under the Supreme Court's analysis in
Long, a warrantless search of Mr. Jenkins' vehicle without probable
cause would not have violated the Fourth Amendment. 6 The Fourth
Circuit's use of broad language to justify the security officer's search in
Jenkins is unnecessary. The court, instead of broadening the govern-
ment's power to search individuals, could have applied the well-estab-
lished Terry87 search exception to the facts in Jenkins.
Automobile Exception to the Warrant Requirement of the Fourth
Amendment
Another well-defined exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment the Fourth Circuit could have applied to the facts
of Jenkins is the automobile exception. Under the automobile excep-
78. Id. at 1036.
79. Id.
80. Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
81. Long, 463 U.S. at 1036.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1049 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).
85. United States v. Jenkins, 986 F.2d 76, 77 (4th Cir. 1993).
86. Long, 436 U.S. at 1032.
87. Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
[Vol. 29:111122
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tion, law enforcement officials may conduct the search of a vehicle
when they have probable cause to believe it contains contraband or
evidence of a crime. 8 This immediate search is justified by the mova-
ble character of an automobile, as well as a reduced expectation of
privacy due to the highly regulated nature of automobiles., 9
In United States v. Vassiliou, a case similar to Jenkins, the defen-
dant was in a heated argument with another individual and allegedly
threatened that individual with a gun.90 The defendant subsequently
attempted to hide the gun in his car. 9 ' Upon being informed of the
threat, the police searched the defendant's car and found the
weapon.92 The court determined that the police had probable cause to
conduct the search because they had a reasonable belief that contra-
band or evidence of a crime existed and thus permitted the admittance
of the gun into evidence. 93
In Jenkins, the court did not reach the government's argument that
it had probable cause to search the car. Instead, the Fourth Circuit
used language that permits either implied consent searches anywhere
on the installation or searches that raise no Fourth Amendment impli-
cations because they occur on closed military installations instead of
analyzing the case under the well-established automobile exception. 94
However, the facts of Jenkins, particularly the threat to kill Ms. Jenkins,
suggest that probable cause to search Mr. Jenkins' automobile existed.
Thus, a blanket exception to the Fourth Amendment on closed military
installations should not be justified in a situation where probable
cause to search does not exist, and the Fourth Circuit in Jenkins
should have used the automobile exception to prevent future courts
from reading its decision too broadly.
Searches Incident to Arrest Exception to the Warrant Requirement of
the Fourth Amendment
The exception to the Fourth Amendment that fits the facts of Jen-
kins most closely is a warrantless search of an automobile incident to
the arrest of an individual. The Supreme Court delineated this excep-
tion in Thornton v. United States when it held, "when a police officer
has made a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of an automobile,
88. Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925).
89. Id. at 151.
90. 820 F.2d 28, 29 (2d Cir. 1987).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. United States v. Jenkins, 986 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1993).
20061
13
Leary: Searching for the Fourth Amendment: In a Post-September 11th Worl
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2006
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
the Fourth Amendment allows the officer to search the passenger com-
partment of that vehicle as a contemporaneous incident of arrest."95
In order to conduct an arrest, the police must have probable cause or
"a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is
involved in criminal activity.
96
In Jenkins, the defendant communicated a threat to kill his wife. 97
The security officials, aware of the threat, could have easily formed a
'reasonable suspicion' that Mr. Jenkins was engaged in criminal activ-
ity.98 The threat made by Mr. Jenkins provided the officials with the
probable cause necessary to arrest or detain him.99 Once the security
guards lawfully arrested Mr. Jenkins, they would then be authorized
under Thornton to conduct a warrantless search of his vehicle with no
additional probable cause required.100
The Fourth Circuit used broad language when it stated that
searches on closed military bases are "exempt from the Fourth Amend-
ment requirement of probable cause." 10 1 The language used by the
court was unnecessary considering the facts of the case and the other
narrower exceptions to the Fourth Amendment that apply. Conse-
quently, future courts should limit their use of the Fourth Circuit's
analysis in Jenkins. Jenkins should be read as allowing warrantless
searches on military installations only when a firmly rooted exception
to the Fourth Amendment applies in a case by case analysis.
Current Military Rules Regarding Searches Preclude a Broad
Interpretation of Jenkins
A broad interpretation of Jenkins would result in a significant ero-
sion of Fourth Amendment protections for individuals present on
closed military installations. 0o2 The current rules and laws pertaining
to searches within the military, however, are entirely inconsistent with
such an interpretation and thus require a narrower reading of the Jen-
kins opinion.
In United States v. Roberts, the United States Court of Military
Appeals examined the issue of whether a service member has an
95. 541 U.S. 615, 617 (2004).
96. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 663 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882-83 (1975)).
97. Jenkins, 986 F.2d at 77.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 617.
101. Jenkins, 986 F.2d at 78.
102. See id.
124 [Vol. 29:111
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expectation of privacy in his barracks room and thus whether a search
of such a room would be governed by the Fourth Amendment. 10 3 In
Roberts, the defendant's barracks room was searched during a com-
mander's inspection of the barracks with a drug dog.' °4 The com-
mander's sole purpose for conducting the search was to locate any
drugs that were being hidden within the barracks.'0 5 The drug dog
detected the presence of drugs, and the commander located marijuana
in the defendant's room. 10 6 The government in Roberts argued that
members of the Armed Forces have no expectation of privacy in their
barracks rooms, because a commander may conduct announced and
unannounced inspections of a barracks room at any time.' 0 7 Further,
commanders should be allowed to conduct "shakedown inspections"
to search for drugs.10 8 Though the court recognized that service mem-
bers give up a certain level of privacy when they enter the military, it
did not adopt the broad rule suggested by the government that would
essentially abolish a service member's Fourth Amendment guarantees
while living in the barracks.' 0 9 The court recognized that a, "'soldier
cannot reasonably expect the Army barracks to be a sanctuary like his
civilian home,' but military quarters have some aspects of a dwelling
or a home and in those respects the military member may reasonably
expect privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment."" 0  The court
also stated:
While the traditional military inspection which looks at the overall fit-
ness of a unit to perform its military mission is a permissible deviation
from what may be tolerated in civilian society generally - recognizing
that such procedure is a reasonable intrusion which a serviceperson
must expect in a military society - the "shakedown inspection" as ear-
lier defined in search specifically of criminal goods or evidence is not
such a permissible intrusion into a person's reasonable expectation of
privacy, even in the military setting."'
The court held that the warrantless search was in violation of the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights." 2
103. 2 MJ. 31 (1976).
104. Id. at 32.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 33.
107. Id. at 34.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. Id. at 36 (quoting Comm. for G.I. Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 477 (D.C.
Cir. 1975)).
111. Roberts, 2 MJ. at 36, see also MIL. R. EVID. 313; MIL R. EVID 314.
112. Roberts, 2 MJ. at 36.
20061
15
Leary: Searching for the Fourth Amendment: In a Post-September 11th Worl
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2006
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
The rule established by the United States Court of Military
Appeals that service members have a reasonable expectation of privacy
and Fourth Amendment protections, even in their highly regulated bar-
racks rooms, is inconsistent with a broad reading of Jenkins that cre-
ates an exception to the Fourth Amendment on military installations.
It would defy logic to argue that civilians who are not members of the
military, therefore not subject to military rules and regulations, have
less privacy on a military installation than do members of the armed
forces on the same installation. Further, a broad reading of Jenkins
would remove the rule established in Roberts because all military bases
are now closed, and thus, every person on a base would have no expec-
tation of privacy at any time and could be searched at any time. Con-
sequently, Jenkins should be read narrowly in a manner consistent
with the current military rules and regulations as established in cases
like Roberts.
The Supreme Court's Analysis of U.S. Border Searches Precludes a
Broad Interpretation of Jenkins
To date the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on a case regarding
the constitutionality of warrantless searches founded solely on a mili-
tary base's closed nature. The Court's analysis regarding searches con-
ducted at the United States border, a similar Fourth Amendment
scenario, however, may provide some indication of its potential deci-
sion concerning warrantless searches on military installations.
In United States v. Flores-Montano, the Court considered the
authority customs officials have to search vehicles at the United States
border. 113 Mr. Manuel Flores-Montano attempted to enter the U.S.
through a border checkpoint in Southern California. 114 A customs
inspector asked Mr. Manuel Flores-Montano to vacate his vehicle and
then made a preliminary inspection of the gas tank by tapping on it. 1 1 5
The customs agent noticed the gas tank had a dense sound when
tapped, at which point, the agent requested a mechanic to disassemble
the gas tank for further inspection. 1 6 The customs agent found more
than eighty-one pounds of marijuana hidden in the gas tank." 7 Mr.
Manuel Flores-Montano argued the marijuana was obtained through
an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and the dis-
113. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004).
114. Id. at 150.
115. Id. at 151.
116. Id.
117. Id.
126 [Vol. 29:111
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trict court approved his motion to suppress the evidence from trial. 1 18
Upon appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
based on the Supreme Court precedent of border searches in United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez.119 The Court in Montoya de Her-
nandez previously held that border searches are subject to the probable
cause and warrant requirements unless they are considered 'routine'
searches.120 In Flores-Montano, the Ninth Circuit held that the search
of the gas tank was not routine and thus required probable cause and a
warrant.1 2 ' The Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit in
Flores-Montano, however, and clarified its previous precedent when it
stated, "[the] expectation of privacy is less at the border than it is in
the interior.' 22 In other words, the government may search individu-
als at the border without probable cause or a warrant but must follow
Fourth Amendment requirements once individuals move beyond the
border to the interior of the country. Consequently, the Court rejected
the Ninth Circuit's holding, and the marijuana obtained from the cus-
toms agent's search in Flores-Montano was admissible against Mr.
Manuel Flores-Montano.
1 23
Some courts have already begun to apply the Supreme Court's
analysis in Flores-Montano to military installations by recognizing the
notion of decreased expectation of privacy on a closed military base
but limiting the area where an individual may be searched without a
warrant to the exterior of a closed military base. The district court in
United States v. Mohrmann analyzed a case involving an individual
searched at the gates of a military installation. 124 Shawn Mohrmann
attempted to enter Fort Leavenworth, Kansas on two separate occa-
sions. 125 On both occasions, security officials at the gate searched Mr.
Mohrmann's vehicle and discovered marijuana. 26 In ruling on the
defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, the court balanced Mr.
Mohrmann's expectation of privacy while in his vehicle with the gov-
ernment's interest in security on Fort Leavenworth.' 27 The court
found as a matter of law an individual has very little expectation of
118. Id.
119. See id. at 152 (discussing 9th Circuit Court's reliance on United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez in affirming district court's decision).
120. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985).
121. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155.
122. Id. at 154 (citing Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538).
123. Id.
124. No. 03-M-7017-01-JPO, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8569 (D. Kan. Apr. 9, 2004).
125. Id. at *2-3.
126. Id.
127. Id. at *21.
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privacy when attempting to enter a military base, because an individ-
ual desiring entrance to a military installation is aware of the change
in security posture present on the exterior of the base since September
11, 2001.128 The court cited Flores-Montano for the propositions that
at the exterior of a military installation an individual has a reduced
expectation of privacy and that the government's interests in security
are heightened. 129 Thus, the court in Mohrmann ultimately held that
the warrantless search was lawful, and the defendant's motion to sup-
press the evidence was denied. 13' The Mohrmann court limited its
analysis to the security checkpoint at the exterior of the military instal-
lation and did not use broad language or suggest that warrantless
searches are authorized during the entire time an individual is present
on a closed military installation.13 1
The Court's decision in Flores-Montano to distinguish between an
individual's decreased expectation of privacy at the borders of the
United States from her expectations of privacy in the interior of the
country would be analogous to the situation in Jenkins. Specifically,
the Court's reasoning in Flores-Montano could apply to Jenkins by
establishing that an individual has a reduced expectation of privacy at
the exterior of a closed military installation, and the individual's
expectation of privacy would increase as she moved towards the inte-
rior of that installation. The Fourth Circuit in Jenkins made specific
mention of an individual's reduced expectation of privacy at the exte-
rior of a military installation when it stated:
The barbed-wire fence, the security guards at the gate, the sign warn-
ing of the possibility of search, and a civilian's common sense aware-
ness of the nature of a military base-all these circumstances combine
to puncture any reasonable expectation of privacy for a civilian who
enters a closed military base.132
Thus, instead of reading Jenkins broadly to mean that law enforcement
could conduct warrantless searches of individuals any time they are
present on a closed military base, under the Supreme Court's analysis
in Flores-Montano, warrantless searches would only be permissible at
the gates of closed installations where individuals enter and exit the
base.
As noted below, the impacts of a broad reading of the Jenkins opin-
ion is well beyond the scope of what the Fourth Circuit was consider-
128. Id.
129. Id. at *22-*23 (citing Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152).
130. Id. at *29.
131. See id.
132. United States v. Jenkins, 986 F.2d 76, 79 (4th Cir. 1993).
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ing at the time Jenkins was decided. Consequently, Jenkins should be
read narrowly as allowing warrantless searches only at the exterior of
closed military installations or where another firmly rooted exception
to the Fourth Amendment applies.
TREATMENT OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S RATIONALE
IN JENKINS IN OTHER CIRCUITS
The various other circuit courts that have analyzed the issue of
closed military installation searches have refrained from creating a
broad exception to the Fourth Amendment based solely on the nature
of a closed military base. If Jenkins were read to create such an excep-
tion, the Fourth Circuit would be an outlier among the other circuits
that have dealt with this issue.
In Morgan v. United States, Greg Morgan was a civilian air traffic
controller employed by the Federal Aviation Administration at
Edwards Air Force Base, California. 133 Edwards was a closed military
installation during Mr. Morgan's employment. 134 One day, during Mr.
Morgan's regular commute to work, he was stopped at the gate prior to
entering the base and was asked if he would consent to a search of his
vehicle. 135 Mr. Morgan refused, indicating that any search would
cause him to be late for work. 136 The officers at the gate did not allow
Mr. Morgan to enter or leave the base, and upon searching his vehicle,
they found a nine-millimeter pistol. 137 Mr. Morgan later sought civil
damages by bringing a claim against the security officers, arguing the
officers violated his constitutional privacy rights.138 The district court
granted the security officers' motion to dismiss Mr. Morgan's claim
suggesting it was not necessary for the security officers to obtain a
warrant or have probable cause prior to conducting a search on a
closed military base. 139 The Ninth Circuit did not adopt the district
court's determination that closed military installations are exempt
from Fourth Amendment requirements. 140 Specifically it stated, "[t]he
district court's reasoning goes too far in allowing a categorical excep-
tion to the probable cause rule for all searches on military bases.' 14 1
133. 323 F.3d 776, 778-79 (9th Cir. 2003).
134. Id. at 779.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 782.
141. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit remanded the case back to the district court and
instructed the district court to determine if the search could be upheld
under the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement. 
14 2
The Fifth Circuit also examined the issue of warrantless searches
on military installations in United States v. Ellis. 1  David Ellis, a
member of the United States Navy, was stationed at the naval air sta-
tion in Pensacola, Florida.144 A military investigator observed a suspi-
cious civilian, William Gaskamp, on the base and followed him to
Ellis' room in the barracks. 145 The investigator questioned Ellis and
Gaskamp and asked Gaskamp for permission to search his vehicle. 14
6
When Gaskamp refused to grant the investigator permission to search,
the investigator asked if Gaskamp had read the visitor's pass he was
given upon entering the base.147 The visitor's pass stated, "Display in
windshield while on station [sic] destroy after leaving station; Visitor;
Acceptance of this pass gives your consent to search this vehicle while
entering, aboard, or leaving this station. ' 148 The investigator asserted
his right to search Gaskamp's vehicle as stated in the visitor's pass,
and upon his search, discovered twenty plastic bags of marijuana. 149
In its decision, the Fifth Circuit noted that although probable
cause was likely present in this case, Gaskamp's implied consent, given
through his acceptance of the visitor's pass, was a valid basis for a
warrantless search. 150 The court's rationale in Ellis was based solely
upon a determination that the defendant had impliedly consented to
the search of his vehicle and did not address whether a warrantless
search is generally authorized on a closed military installation.15 ' The
consent exception that was cited by the Fifth Circuit in this case is
limited to the facts. Specifically, Ellis was in possession of a pass that
granted him limited access to the military base, and the possession of
that pass constituted consent to be searched. 152 The Fifth Circuit did
not use any broad language suggesting that all individuals present on a
closed military installation impliedly consent to a search at any time,
142. Id.
143. 547 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1977).
144. Id. at 864.
145. Id. at 865.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 866.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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and it limited its holding to situations where individuals possess a pass
that specifically identifies the scope of their consent to be searched.
153
In United States v. Vaughan, Marshall Vaughan, a civilian, sought
entrance to Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma in 1973.14 Due to the
high probability for anti-Vietnam War demonstrations, the commander
of the base closed the installation to all visitors.1 55 When Vaughan
attempted to enter the base, instead of denying him access and telling
him to leave, the security guards at the base's entry point directed him
to park on the side of the road and proceeded to search his vehicle
without his consent. 156 During their search, the security guards dis-
covered marijuana in Vaughan's vehicle.15 7 The Tenth Circuit found
the warrantless search without probable cause to be in violation of
Vaughan's Fourth Amendment rights.158 Though it recognized the
authority of the military to conduct searches at the security check-
point of the installation, the court stated, "once a determination has
been made not to allow defendant entry to the base, any search con-
ducted thereafter must meet Fourth Amendment standards." 159 Conse-
quently, the court did not allow the admission of marijuana discovered
in the unlawful search to be admitted into evidence against
Vaughan.
160
To read Jenkins broadly as creating an exception for warrantless
searches on closed military installations at any time would be wholly
inconsistent with the analysis of the other circuits that have analyzed
this issue and would result in a radical decrease in constitutional pro-
tections for individuals within the Fourth Circuit. Thus, a narrower
read of Jenkins is logical, reasonable, and would be consistent with the
analysis of the other circuit courts that have dealt with this issue.
WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF A BROAD INTERPRETATION
OF THE JENKINS DECISION?
The result of interpreting the Jenkins case as allowing law enforce-
ment officials to conduct a search without probable cause or a warrant
simply because an individual is present on a closed military installa-
153. Id.
154. 475 F.2d 1262, 1263 (10th Cir. 1973).
155. Id. at 1263.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1264.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1265.
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tion would be a severe limiting of individual liberties.161 Since Septem-
ber 11, 2001, all military installations are considered closed according
to the judicial definition.' 6 2 Though these installations are closed
within the meaning given by the courts, they still allow members of the
general public to enter the installation on any given day for a variety of
reasons (i.e. to visit the historical sites on bases, to work and to provide
services to the members of the armed forces, etc.). Consequently, indi-
viduals living on or near military installations can expect their Fourth
Amendment protections to diminish if Jenkins is interpreted at its
broadest.
There are also numerous and far-reaching future implications if all
searches on military bases are "exempt from the usual Fourth Amend-
ment requirement of probable cause." 163 Ultimately, there is the
potential for military commanders to attempt to assert their general
authority to protect the installation from drugs and other harmful con-
traband by conducting searches and inspections of individuals in the
absence of probable cause. Even though it seems to defy previous
Fourth Amendment analysis, there is also the potential for military
investigators to interpret Jenkins as authority to search individuals'
homes on bases without regard to probable cause.
A broad interpretation of the decision in Jenkins applied in a post-
September 11 th world could have implications well beyond the gates of
military bases. Using the general interest of national security, state
and federal agencies would likely be allowed to increase their authority
to conduct warrantless searches of individuals in and around federal
buildings. Also, due to the recent terrorist activities in Europe that
resulted in attacks on mass transit systems, state entities could assert
their authority to conduct warrantless searches in and around mass
transit systems in the United States. For example, in response to the
London subway bombings, officials in New York City initiated a pro-
gram in July 2005 to randomly search the bags of passengers commut-
ing on the subway. 164 Though the courts have not been called upon to
determine the constitutionality of the New York searches, there is a
concern that officials may have overstepped their authority by initiat-
ing this program. 165 The Jenkins decision, in its broadest sense, taken
to its logical extension, could swallow up the Fourth Amendment guar-
161. See United States v. Jenkins, 986 F.2d 76 (4th Cir. 1993).
162. See United States v. Ellis, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1029 (D. Colo. 1998).
163. Jenkins, 986 F.2d at 78.
164. Sewell Chan and Kareem Fahim, Legal Issues Being Raised on Searches in
Subways, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2005, § 1, at 25.
165. Id.
132 [Vol. 29:111
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antees to individuals on a military base and could be used to severely
erode those guarantees to individuals throughout society.
THE COURT'S DEFERENCE TO MILITARY COMMANDERS
There is a possibility that if the Supreme Court analyzed the issue
in Jenkins it would uphold a broad interpretation and permit military
investigators to conduct searches both at the exterior and the interior
of military installations even in the absence of probable cause on the
basis of military deference. In the past, when the Court has weighed
various constitutional protections of an individual against a military
commander's duties to maintain good order and discipline of their
unit and prepare their unit for combat, the Court has given great defer-
ence to military commanders. 166 However, the Court's previous allo-
cations of deference to the military did not have as broad an impact on
individual rights as the decision in Jenkins would allow if adopted and
applied by all courts.
In Greer v. Spock, the Supreme Court weighed the issues of an
individual's First Amendment right of expression through speech with
the military commander's right and duty to protect Fort Dix, New
Jersey from outside threats.' 67 In 1972, Benjamin Spock was the can-
didate of the People's Party for the office of President of the United
States. 168 Spock and others wrote the commanding officer at Fort Dix
requesting permission to campaign on the installation; the com-
mander denied their request. 169 Spock then filed suit claiming the
Fort Dix regulations were in violation of the First and Fifth Amend-
ments. 170 The Supreme Court, in overturning the district court's
injunction preventing the commander at Fort Dix from interfering with
political rallies, found the military and its commanders have a consti-
tutional duty to train soldiers and prepare for war and should not have
to provide a public forum for speeches.' 7 ' Though the Supreme Court
recognized a military commander's authority to exclude civilians from
the area of his command, it did not grant the commander the plenary
166. See generally Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); see also Ben-
Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989); Watson v. Ark. Nat'l Guard, 886 F.2d
1004 (8th Cir. 1989); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
167. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
168. Id. at 832.
169. Id. at 832-33.
170. Id. at 833-34.
171. Id. at 838.
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power to exclude the distribution of every publication that was politi-
cal in nature.' 7 2 The Court specifically stated:
The only publications that a military commander may disapprove are
those that he finds constitute a clear danger to military loyalty, disci-
pline, or morale, and he may not prevent distribution of a publication
simply because he does not like its contents, or because it is critical,
even unfairly critical, of government policies or officials.17 3
Spock was ultimately unable to campaign at Fort Dix without the com-
mander's express authorization. 174
In Goldman v. Weinberger, the Court weighed the issues of an
individual's First Amendment right to freely practice his religion with
the military's need to have uniformity among service members while
in uniform. 175 Simcha Goldman, an Orthodox Jew, was a member of
the United States Air Force.' 7 6 Goldman brought suit against the Sec-
retary of Defense claiming Air Force regulations that prevented him
from wearing his yarmulke violated his constitutional right to practice
religion.' 7 7 The Court found that the military's need to maintain good
order and discipline of its members outweighed the individual interest
to express religion through wearing a religious symbol.' 78 In particu-
lar, the Court noted, "when evaluating whether military needs justify a
particular restriction on religiously motivated conduct, courts must
give great deference to the professional judgment of military authori-
ties concerning the relative importance of a particular military inter-
est."' 79 Thus, the Air Force regulation prohibiting members from
wearing a yarmulke in uniform was upheld. 8 °
Although the government often cites the need for military defer-
ence, the Court's deference in Greer and Goldman is distinguishable
from the Fourth Circuit's broad grant of authority in Jenkins. In Greer,
the Court's decision supported the existing constitutional separation
of the military from the political process.' 8 ' Further, the Court in
Greer did not grant authority to exclude all distributions of political
172. Id. at 840.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
176. Id. at 504-05.
177. Id. at 506.
178. Id. at 507.
179. Id.; see also Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
180. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 510.
181. See U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2 (allocating the position of commander-in-chief to the
President thus protecting the citizenry from the vast power of the military and at the
same time placing political responsibilities on political leaders not military leaders).
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material. 182 The Court's decision merely recognized a commander's
authority to exclude those materials that would constitute a danger to
the loyalty of his subordinates.'l 3 In Goldman, the Court's decision
recognized the importance of cohesiveness within the military and pre-
vented an individual's expressions from hindering that cohesion.
8 4
However, the Court's decision in Goldman does not prevent an individ-
ual from expressing a religious preference while not in uniform.
1
,
5
Most importantly, the decision in Goldman did not impact individuals
not serving in the military. Furthermore, those who join the military
voluntarily do so understanding and expecting to forgo certain free-
doms and liberties they may have enjoyed in civilian life. For example,
a soldier's entire appearance from the length of his hair to where and
what kind of tattoos he may have on his body are governed by Army
regulation. 1 86
If one accepts Jenkins as authorizing a closed installation excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment, the Fourth Circuit's rationale would
grant broad levels of authority to military investigators and com-
manders to search citizens without probable cause or a warrant.8 7 In
its previous decisions, when the Supreme Court gave the military the
authority to suspend the freedom of expression while in uniform, it
did not completely remove that individual's right to practice her consti-
tutionally guaranteed right on her own time.' By allowing the mili-
tary to conduct warrantless searches without probable cause, the court
in Jenkins would not only suspend a constitutional guarantee, it would
remove that guarantee completely while on a closed military installa-
tion. Consequently, a broad interpretation of Jenkins extends well
beyond the Supreme Court's general deference to the military in decid-
ing constitutional questions.
CONCLUSION
Now think back to the scenario discussed in the beginning of this
comment, where you and your family are traveling on a closed military
installation. A broad reading of the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Jenkins
would allow the military police officer to search you, your family, and
your minivan without a warrant and without probable cause. Under a
182. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976).
183. Id.
184. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507.
185. Id.
186. U.S. Dep't Army, Reg. 670-1, para. 1-8.
187. United States v. Jenkins, 986 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1993).
188. See Goldman, 475 U.S. 503.
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narrower reading, however, this potentially frightening situation would
never develop, because the military police officer would be unable to
subject your family to an unjustified search unless you were entering
or exiting the installation. You and your family could enjoy the cele-
bration of our nation's independence without an unwarranted intru-
sion by the government.
There is no doubt the language used by the Fourth Circuit in Jen-
kins is broad and could be interpreted as allowing law enforcement
officials to search individuals at any time on a closed military installa-
tion without a warrant or probable cause. Additionally, the Supreme
Court has a general recognition for deference to military commanders
in questions that affect loyalty, good order, discipline, and the safety of
their units.1 8 9 However, the Court has never allowed the complete
eradication of a constitutional guarantee on a military installation,
even when faced with the special needs of the military. 190 Further, the
facts of Jenkins, the current military rules concerning searches of ser-
vice members, and the Supreme Court's analysis regarding border
searches all suggest a narrow interpretation of Jenkins. Future courts
should only read Jenkins as either allowing warrantless searches with-
out probable cause at the exterior of a military installation when an
individual seeks to enter or exit the base or as allowing warrantless
searches on closed military installations when a firmly rooted excep-
tion to the Forth Amendment applies to the given facts of a case. Any
broader interpretation of Jenkins could have unnecessary and drastic
impacts on the privacy of individuals in and around the many closed
military installations across the United States.
Ryan Leary
189. See id; Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
190. See Goldman 475 U.S. 503; see also Greer, 424 U.S. 828.
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